






Af ri ca's wars
The historical context
O
f the current génération of wars in
Africa, most are not new. They are not
the result of globalisation, nor of the
end of the Cold War, nor even of the economie
crisis that has affected Africa so badly,
although they have been shaped by those and
other developments.
The historical roots of
violence
In most cases, it is possible to
trace a direct line of descent
from today's wars back to
struggles in the middle of the
last Century, which in most of
Africa was the late colonial
period. At a time when power
was up for grabs, political
compétition became focussed ™^^^^^^™
on the control of emerging independent states,
and in some cases rivalries old and new
became stained with blood and are stored in
thé memories of subséquent générations.
Rwanda is a good example, for although
many people in the world had hardly heard
of Rwanda until the genocide of 1994, the
tragedies of recent years have to be under-
stood in relation to a history of massacres and
counter-massacres in the Gréât Lakes région,
involving Hutus and Tutsis in both Rwanda
"All over Africa, even
in places where there
are no wars, or where
fighting has erupted
only recentty, politics
at the top level has
generally been a
ruthless business"
and Burundi, and affecting neighbouring
populations in Congo, Uganda and Tanzania,
that goes back to the 1950s and the period of
décolonisation. For many Rwandans, 1994
was not a unique bloodbath: it was simply the
most awful in a cycle of killings.
In Sudan too, the war of Khartoum
against the south began in the
1950s, and is best seen as part
of a wider struggle between
the seat of government and its
peripheral régions that is also
plain to see in the current dév-
astation of the country's west-
ern région of Darfur. In
Liberia, although war broke
out in 1989, just a few weeks
after the fall of the Berlin wall,
many Liberians place the start
of their misfortunes as the military dictator-
ship of the 1980s, or with the military coup
that overthrew the old regime of the True
Whig Party, outmoded and out of steam, at
the start of that decade.
All over Africa, even in places where
there are no wars, or where fighting has
erupted only recently, as in Côte d'Ivoire, pol-
itics at the top level has generally been a
ruthless business. Where Clausewitz defined
war as a continuation of politics by other
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means, the recent history of many parts of
Africa reverses this dictum: high politics is
war by other means. Probably the first intel-
lectuals to grasp the nature of Africa's post-
colonial politics were not academies, but
novelists. Writers like Chinua Achebe and
Ngugi wa Thiongo penning works in Eng-
lish, or Ahmadou Kourouma in French,
clearly understood 30 or more years ago the
nature of politics in the countries where
they lived. For the most part, it was only
much later that social scientists like the late
Claude Ake were able to produce texts with
anything approaching the same feeling for
the ruthlessness and cynicism of politics in
modern Africa.
It is well established that
the pursuit of power is a
ruthless and often cynical
business all over the world,
and that Africa has no
monopoly in these matters.
But présidents or prime min-
isters in more fortunate
places, no matter how much
they may crave power, are
likely to find that they are
obliged to relinquish tenure
by judges who are guided
by légal texts and by média that are gener-
ally in favour of limited mandates, while
political leaders are unable to receive thé
support of gênerais in any bid to overturn
thé constitution. Europe and North Ameri-
ca have generally succeeded in establishing
firm institutional controls on the power of
even the strengest chief executive of the
state - although it is useful to recall that fas-
cist dictatorships existed in western Europe
even in thé 1970s, and that there are plenty
of current examples in central and southern
Asia, Latin America and elsewhere that
demonstrate that a militarised form of pol-
itics can prevail anywhere. Africa is not








lies in thé colonial
expérience"
Explaining thé causes
African intellectuals tend to attribute this
state of affairs ultimately to colonial rule
itself . They can point out that colonial rule was
imposed by thé use or threat of military force
siïid that it largely disrespected thé idéas
about balancing and containing executive
power that had previously prevailed in Africa.
Once colonial rule was really established -
which in much of thé area soufh of the Sahara
means a hundred years ago or even less - it
was implemented by bureaucratie action for-
mulated by functionaries of the state. By and
large, only in the very last decade of colonial
rule, in thé 1950s, did colonial government in
Africa contain any significant element of
democracy. The process of
décolonisation was in the end
so fast that there was hardly
time to blink between the
authoritarianism of colonial
governors and that of African
présidents.
In short, many African
commentators consider that
the origin of the style of pol-
itics they have known since
independence, induding in
those cases where political
conflict and economie enrichment have
turned violent, lies in the colonial expéri-
ence. This, they maintain, was so crucial in
f orming the institutions of the states existing
today as to have cast a shadow over subsé-
quent générations.
All of this is true enough. But the key con-
sidération has to be in regard to the implica-
tions of these observations. In other words:
so what if colonial rule was oppressive?
Africans have had almost half a Century to put
things right. Anyone who believes that a war
becomes inévitable because of things that
happened decades or even centuries ago is,
in effect, arguing that they do not have any
significant control over events or even over
their own actions. So heavy is the weight of
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history, they imply, that the living can do lit-
tle but act in established patterns.
This seems unduly fatalistic and can also,
it is important to note, be used by cynics to
deny responsibility for theix own misdeeds.
Politicians who can convince their public that
they are bound by historica! forces to act in
certain ways can get away with murder.
Again, Africa has no monopoly on such ways
of seeing thé world: Northern Ireland has
plenty of the same, as do India and Pakistan,
or Israël and Palestine, also endlessly replay-
ing thé traumas of partition and the transfer
of power in the aftermath of the Second
World War.
The reinvention of Africa
In this sensé, today's génération of wars in
Africa is a key historical moment. How peo-
ple act and react, in Africa and outside, will
détermine what happens next. It will also
shape Africans' ideas about the extent to
which they actually can control their own
destiny.
Like all crucial phases in history, it is
impossible to interpret the meaning of current
upheavals with confidence for as long as they
are still in progress. Taking a long view, it is
possible to take some stark comfort from
European history, by pointing out that
Europe's modem states were forged by bat-
tle, and that if states make wars, it is also true
that wars make states. But Europe's history
cannot be taken as a sure guide to Africa or
to anywhere else which has a history of its
own.
It could indeed émerge that war in Côte
d'Ivoire or in thé Gréât Lakes turns out in the
longer run to be the crucible of new state for-
mations, as thé Thirty Years' War was in
Europe three and a half centuries ago. But it
is equally possible that such wars represent
not the émergence of strong new states, but
thé érosion of most of the surviving institu-
tions of colonial rule. It is possible that they
will usher in a period of warlordism and
perpétuai campaigning that also has a his-
torical precedent, namely the raiding for
plunder that was characteristic of the era of
thé slave trade.
Quite simply, we won't know until the
new patterns become clear, over time. What
can already be said with some confidence,
however, is that thé style of government
introduced in colonial tirnes is disappearing
in much of Africa and that new patterns are
emerging, fully integrated into thé twenty-
first Century globe, but often showing inter-
esting continuities with older African history
also. The rôle of international organisations
in African affairs, from Oxfam to thé World
Bank; thé influence of global media; the
exploitation of markets in arms, diamonds or
anything else; thé importance of diaspora
populations and the transfer of remittances:
these are all signs of the global intégration of
Africa's current wars. The reinvention of tra-
ditional initiation societies and thé appeal to
local historiés of coopération and conflict are
signs of the weight of the past. In South
Africa, this sensé of an older African history
reasserting itself is central to thé notion that
an African renaissance is taking place, or
should be taking place. Other observers may
prefer a différent label, but whatever they call
it, thé tendency for Africa to reinvent itself
cannot easily be doubted.
War is a grisly business, and thé often bla-
tant association between large-scale killing
and crade self-enrichment in some of Africa's
current wars can be hard to contemplate.
However, there are at least two related ways
in which political élites have reacted to the
current wars in thé continent that demonstrate
some hopeful signs, and which, in any event,
are shaping these wars.
One new development is the émergence of
an aspiration in Africa itself to bring an end
to particular wars through formai and coor-
dinated state action. Examples include thé
success of the African Union (AU), largely at
South African behest, in advancing a peace
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process in Burundi, and the AU's willingness
to disrespect the sovereignty of one of its
member-states, Sudan, for the sake of allevi-
ating suffering in Darfur. In fhis latter case,
the action taken so far has been small in
scale, but nonetheless marks a significant
new attitude towards rnajor conflicts. In the
same sense, regional groupings such as IGAD
in the Horn of Africa and ECOWAS in West
Africa have played positive rôles in attempts
to end conflicts in southern Sudan and in Côte
d'Ivoire respectively.
A second notable development in conflict
resolution is a new and more productive
récognition of the importance of coopération
between Africans and outsiders. A decade
ago, it was hard to imagine any major African
government tolerating or advocating a rôle for
the armed forces of former colonial states in
the solution of an African conflict. And yet no
African conflict is a purely parochial matter:
in the twenty-first Century, all of them involve
global strategie considérations and are con-
nected to global markets. It is therefore logi-
cal to suppose that the resolution of such
conflicts must also involve collaboration
between African and non-African éléments.
Hence, the £act that the collaboration of British
and United Nations forces in Sierra Leone, or
of French and West African or UN forces in
Côte d'Ivoire, has received thé support of the
Nigérian government, represents a major step
forward. More precisely, it marks a récogni-
tion of thé fact that thé African states which
emerged from colonial rule in thé mid-20th
Century remain joint ventures in important
respects, and that their immédiate future is
dépendent on coopération between Africans
and outsiders.
This is not a new form of colonialism, for
thé essence of colonialism was the imposition
of an inferior legal status by outsiders. The
new joint ventures for peacekeeping or peace-
making are negotiated, they have the légiti-
mation of other African states and of the
international community and they do not
include any attempt to assign a particular
légal status to Africans.
It is, alas, too soon to know whether thé
worst of Africa's wars is now behind us, or
whether it is still to corne. Much will depend
on the success of efforts to restore peace in
individual countries in a continent that has
more UN peacekeeping missions than any
other. Much too will depend on what happens
in Iraq, which, like Africa, is largely a colo-
nial création that could conceivably fragment
into smaller units and which thereby poses a
huge challenge to thé existing international
order. The international order of which we
speak is essentially that created at the end of
thé Second World War, when so many of the
world's current states gained independence
from colonial rule, and when many of today's
institutions of international governance were
established.
Africans will need to be convinced that it
is possible to improve their position by their
own efforts. But cold reality also suggests that,
in so many parts of the continent, even radi-
cally improved governance can do little to lift
people's living standards and future prospects
if thé raies and norms of international éco-
nomie activity remain so heavily rigged
against them •
